A Critique of Corporate Law by Wolfson, Nicholas
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 34 




A Critique of Corporate Law 
Nicholas Wolfson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate Law, 34 U. Miami L. Rev. 959 (1980) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol34/iss4/9 
This Leading Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of 
Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
LEADING ARTICLES
A Critique of Corporate Law
NICHOLAS WOLFSON*
A central issue in the law of corporations revolves around
the costs associated with the separation of ownership and con-
trol in the modern corporate enterprise. The law concerning
business associations reflects a belief that these costs are best
controlled by imposing legal duties on corporate officers to act
in the shareholders' best interests. The author argues that mar-
ket forces police the behavior of corporate managers in a way
that makes corporate law doctrine on this point redundant,
and in some cases inefficient.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Modern corporate law with respect to the publicly held corpo-
ration largely reflects an effort to resolve the issue of separation of
ownership and control. This issue is the management discretion
problem that was popularized by Berle and Means some forty
* Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law.
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years ago.' Actually, Adam Smith described the problem two hun-
dred years ago as follows:
The directors of such [joint stock] companies . . . , being the
managers rather of another people's money than of their own, it
cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the
same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private
copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards
of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small mat-
ters as not for their master's honour, and very easily give them-
selves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion,
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management
of the affairs of such a company.'
The latter-day equivalents of joint stock companies are the
large publicly held corporations. In those business units, thousands
of public shareholders have little or no direct control over the
management decisions of the directors and officers. Conventional
knowledge assumes, therefore, that frustrated shareholders desire
control. In addition, conventional theory concludes that the insid-
ers (at least in concentrated noncompetitive industries) are free to
award themselves not only "excessive" salaries but also such non-
pecuniary awards as hunting lodges, friendly secretaries, and con-
genial, albeit incompetent, associates. Moreover, traditional theory
asserts that corporate insiders have discretion to perform "anti-
social" acts, such as selling large gas-guzzling automobiles rather
than small economy models.a
In direct response to this familiar theory, corporate law (in a
great variety of cases involving conflict between corporate insiders
and public shareholders) has elaborated in sophisticated form the
basic fiduciary doctrine known as the duty of loyalty.' Equally im-
portant are the legislative efforts under way to limit officer power
by restructuring corporate governance to require a majority of in-
dependent directors for decisionmaking and greater shareholder
power and participation.5
The case and statutory law are based upon the largely un-
1. A. BERLE, JR. & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev.
ed. 1968).
2. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH Ov NATIONS 700 (E. Cannan ed. 1966).
3. See generally R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION
(1976).
4. See W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 469 (4th ed. 1970).
5. See Miller, At Odds Over Corporate Governance, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1978, § F
(Business and Finance), at 1, col. 3; Russo and Wolfson, Why Must Boards Change? N.Y.
Times, Jan. 21, 1979, § F (Business and Finance), at 16, col. 4.
[Vol. 34:959
CRITIQUE OF CORPORATE LAW
proven empirical assumptions that the separation of ownership
and control is not economically optimal and that the legal response
to the problem lessens or eliminates the inefficiencies at a cost
which is less than the benefits obtained. With respect to publicly
held corporations, corporate law acts on these assumptions without
examining them in the light of coherent economic theory or sub-
jecting them to disciplined empirical tests. Essentially guesswork,
these assumptions substitute for the organized theoretical and em-
pirical processes that are routine in other social disciplines, such as
economics.
An additional hypothesis, also unproven, is that market con-
trols are not sufficient to circumscribe significantly the insider-
management discretion to "feather the nest" at the expense of
shareholders and the general public. Indeed much of corporate law
can be described as both a reaction to the perceived management
discretion problem and as an unproven method to emasculate the
assumed significant discretion of management which flows from
the separation of management and control.'
To begin with, there is the basic proposition of corporate law
that directors have a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder
wealth.7 If in fact the free market operated to accomplish this re-
sult, the doctrine would have the same impact as carrying the leg-
endary coals to Newcastle. There are the corollary fiduciary princi-
ples, such as the corporate opportunity,8 sale of control," and going
private'0 doctrines, which are designed to prevent management
capture of corporate values that belong to the shareholders. The
federal securities laws, which in general mandate corporate disclo-
sure and prohibit fraud in the purchase or sale of securities, are
focused upon the same target-to circumscribe management dis-
cretion-and the same empirical assumption-that legal rules will
change behavior in the desired direction at a cost which is less
than the benefits obtained."
This paper will examine the fundamental bases of corporate
law. In the course of that analysis it will demonstrate that corpo-
rate law is "flying blind"-without an empirical basis and with a
6. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 289-314 (2d ed. 1977).
7. See Corporate Directors Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595, 1606 (1978).
8. Id. at 1600.
9. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
10. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14,185 (Nov. 17, 1977), [1977-1978 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,366.
11. See Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 132 (1973).
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confused notion of economic theory.12 The analysis will (a) apply
modern economic theory to the concept of the corporate form, (b)
emphasize the superior efficacy of market forces, as compared to
corporate law, to accomplish the corporate law goal of limiting
management discretion, and (c) underline the need for proponents
of corporate law to make reasonable efforts to estimate its costs




Corporate law operates on the assumption that the separation
of ownership and control is a manifestation of a unique corporate
peculiarity. Actually, it is merely a subset of a much wider phe-
nomenon. s Whenever an employer hires another person to per-
form services for him involving some decisionmaking, an agency
relationship is created. If the agent is an average individual with
an average component of self-interest, he will not always act in the
best interest of the employer. Naturally, employers know this and
endeavor to monitor the agent's performance in a way that mini-
miles the cost of shirking ("agency costs") to the employer. 4
In fact, the same phenomenon occurs whenever two or more
people work together. Co-authors of law review articles face the
same problem. Author A may sit back, write only one-third of the
article, and hope to receive full public recognition for at least half
the published work. Author B will have to monitor A's work to
prevent these unhappy results.
Agency costs exist in all forms of organization. In large govern-
ment bureaucracies and universities, employees at all levels may
12. For a discussion of the empirical failings of securities law in the context of the
private offering doctrine, see Wolfson, The Need for Empirical Research in Securities Law,
49 S. CAL. L. REV. 286 (1976).
13. The materials in this section are based upon the recent seminal article by econom-
ics Professors M. Jensen and W. Meckling: Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Mana-
gerial Behavior, Agency Costa and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FINANCIAL ECON. 305 (1976).
14. The concepts of "shirking" and monitoring are closely related to the economic the-
ory of agency costs, and were developed by economics Professors A.A. Alchian and H. Dem-
setz. This section is also based upon their pioneering work. See Alchian & Demsetz, Produc-
tion, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). See
also Alchian, Corporate Management and Property Rights, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE
REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 337 (H. Manne ed. 1969). For a survey of the recent
literature in the fields covered by this section see also Furubotn & Pejovich, Property
Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature, 10 J. ECON. LIT. 1137 (1972).
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endeavor to maximize their personal comfort at the expense of
group efficiency. For example, a government bureaucrat may prefer
large offices, congenial associates, and a large staff. If citizens had
the time and money to detect these actions, they would compel
him to produce the same amount of work or more at less cost, or
hire someone else willing and able to do it. Since government agen-
cies and universities are not profit-oriented, there is no bottom line
profit test to measure management efficiency. Therefore, monitor-
ing of agency costs is more difficult in these nonprofit organiza-
tions than in businesses run for profit.
The cost to the organization of the agent's self-interest, in ad-
dition to the cost of detecting shirking, represents the agency costs
of the enterprise. These costs include: (a) the cost of monitoring
expenditures; (b) the cost of incentives to encourage the agent to
work for the benefit of the organization; (c) so-called "bonding
costs" of the agent which he may sometimes incur to convince the
skeptical employer that he will indeed be loyal; and (d) a "residual
loss" resulting from the selfish acts of the agent.18
Agency costs are also a fact of life in the publicly owned
profit-oriented corporation. The shareholders are the owners or
principals; the agents are the directors, officers, and employees of
the corporation. The owners, i.e., the shareholders, want the man-
agement of the corporation to maximize the welfare of sharehold-
ers to the same extent as would the shareholders if they managed
the corporation. Officers may wish to lead the "quiet" life. They
may opt for carpeted hallways, beautiful secretaries (or handsome
ones), and five-hour work days. They may be reluctant to take ap-
propriate entrepreneurial risks. They may promote the size of the
enterprise rather than net profits and efficiency. They may neglect
needed research and development expenditures. They may be
more sensitive to the demands of civic groups and labor than to
those of a hard-muscled owner-run entrepreneurial enterprise.
Managers may work more strenuously than risk-taking shareholder
owner-managers would for nonfluctuating or steadily rising divi-
dends and capital gains.
Agency costs may arise in the case of so-called control share-
holders also. Control shareholders need not own fifty-one percent
of the stock. A ten-percent holder, for example, can be a control
shareholder in a corporation where no one else owns a large block
of stock. Individual shareholders who own less than all of the eq-
15. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 13, at 308.
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uity may make operating decisions that do not maximize the util-
ity of the mass of shareholders. The smaller the percentage they
own, the greater the divergence of their interest from that of the
rest of the shareholders. As Professors Jensen and Meckling have
stated:
If the owner-manager sells equity claims on the cooporation
* . . agency costs will be generated by the divergence between
his interest and those of the outside shareholders, since he will
then bear only a fraction of the costs of any non-pecuniary bene-
fits he takes out in maximizing his own utility. If the manager
owns only 95 percent of the stock, he will expend resources to
the point where the marginal utility derived from a dollar's ex-
penditure of the firm's resources on such items equals the mar-
ginal utility of an additional 95 cents in general purchasing
power (i.e., his share of the wealth reduction) and not one
dollar.16
Agency costs also arise in close corporations, where stockhold-
ers share ownership and control. Each shareholder must worry
about the shirking of the other owner-managers. But since share
ownership is less dispersed than in a publicly held corporation,
agency costs will tend to be less. The greater the percentage of
ownership, the less the divergence of interest from the other share-
holders. Furthermore, monitoring is easier. The active shareholder-
manager can more readily check the activities of fellow managers
than can a passive small shareholder in a publicly held corpora-
tion. In addition, monitoring is worth more to the former than to
the latter in that the shareholder-manager has more to lose if his
monitoring fails. Legal doctrines of agency responsibility and duty
of loyalty exist between shareholders in the closely held corpora-
tion as a result of, or in reaction to, the existence of agency costs.
The legal doctrine, however, is not the key factor in close corpora-
tion planning. The principal task of close corporation lawyers is to
arrange the charter, bylaws, and shareholder contracts so as to
share control effectively among the shareholders and prevent one
from freezing out the others. The latter arrangements are not
available to public corporations. Indeed, a lawyer who leaves his
shareholder-clients from a closely held corporation to the remedies
of fiduciary duty, without attempting to structure the corporation
to protect them, is open to severe criticism because of the uncer-
tainties and cost of duty-of-loyalty litigation.
16. Id. at 312.
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Despite the existence of greater agency costs, the corporation
owned by dispersed, small shareholders has increased in relative
importance. Large, family-owned corporations have radically de-
clined in number and significance. The former has met and passed
the test of survivorship. There are several reasons for this success.
To begin with, manager-proprietors are frequently unable to
finance large scale business expansion entirely out of their own
funds. They must often raise some debt and equity capital from
individual and institutional sources to improve and expand their
business enterprises. The other side of the coin is that investors
find it prudent and .rewarding to place their capital under the con-
trol of expert and experienced corporate managers. Although there
are considerable agency costs involved, it is obviously worthwhile
to small public shareholders to hire managers to run business en-
terprises rather than actively participate themselves.
The existence of agency costs does not mean that the dis-
persed shareholder corporate enterprise is inefficient. The costs are
an unavoidable price of joint activity or organization. The alter-
native for shareholders is to actively manage the business. That
alternative would be an obvious absurdity. Even then, as in the
case of co-authors of a law review article, some agency costs would
be incurred. The only viable alternative is for one person both to
own and to run the firm.
In short, the modern corporation-in its widely dispersed
shareholder form-is an inevitable result of the willingness and de-
sire of tens of thousands of relatively small investors to entrust
their money to skilled, hired managers. It is also a natural product
of the desire of large institutional investors, who have no urge to
manage the business, to put their finances in the hands of expert
corporate officers.
Professors Jensen and Meckling, in their seminal piece on the
firm, state:
In conclusion, finding that agency costs are non-zero (i.e.,
that there are costs associated with the separation of ownership
and control in the corporation) and concluding therefrom that
the agency relationship is non-optimal, wasteful or inefficient is
equivalent in every sense to comparing a world in which iron ore
is a scarce commodity (and therefore costly) to a world in which
it is freely available at zero resource cost, and concluding that
the first world is "non-optimal" - a perfect example of the fal-
lacy criticized by Coase . . .and what Demsetz .. .character-
19801
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izes as the "Nirvana" form of analysis.17
Of course, if agency costs could be reduced or eliminated by
shareholder monitoring of management at a cost which is less than
the benefits derived, the course of action would be simple and
clear: always increase the curbs on management. Monitoring, how-
ever, is costly and at various levels may not be worth the benefits
obtained. Governmentally mandated monitoring in the form of ju-
dicial or statutory law and doctrines must always be measured
against the cost-benefit test. Too often, as shall be demonstrated in
this paper, the cost impact of corporate law is totally ignored.
Furthermore, given the efficient nature of the capital markets,
it is likely that the price of shares has been discounted for agency
costs. There is considerable economic literature demonstrating that
the efficient stock market impounds in the price of shares all sig-
nificant public information about corporations. 18 Data on quality
of management, financial stability, and quality of products are rap-
idly diffused to investors with almost immediate impact on the
price of the stock.1 9 There is good reason to believe that the same
phenomenon occurs as a result of investors' awareness of the cost
of separation of ownership and control. Indeed, the work of Jensen
and Meckling20 makes a formal demonstration of such a phenome-
non. Their conclusion is that shareholders invest in such corpora-
tions because the benefits from the corporate operation outweigh
the disadvantage of agency costs.
B. Incentives Not to Shirk
The foregoing discussion assumes that, in fact, agents shirk. In
the real world shirking is, for various reasons, far more insignifi-
cant than is traditionally assumed.
In the first place, since the price of shares impounds the
agency costs, managers have an incentive to prove to the investors
that they are shirking less.2 Otherwise, the cost to the corporation
17. Id. at 328.
18. Basu, Investment Performance of Common Stocks in Relation to Their Price-
Earnings Ratios: A Test of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, 32 J. FIN. 663 (1977); Davies &
Canes, Stock Prices and the Publication of Second-Hand Information, 51 J. Bus. 43 (1978);
Hillison, Empirical Investigation of General Purchasing Power Adjustments on Earnings
Per Share and the Movement of Security Prices, 17 J. AccT. RESEARCH 60 (1979); LeRoy,
Efficient Capital Markets: Comment, 31 J. FIN. 139 (1976).
19. See generally THE RANDOM CHARACTER OF STOCK MARKET PRICES (P. Cootner ed.
1964).
20. See note 13 supra.
21. Benston, The Market for Public Accounting Services: Demand, Supply and Regu-
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of raising new equity capital will be greater. In addition, manage-
ment will suffer compensation losses since its incentive arrange-
ments are often in the form of corporate equity. Furthermore, if
managers actually shirk less than the market anticipates, they will
suffer unjustified losses in the price of the stock. These factors act
as powerful incentives for the managers to demonstrate to the
market that they are not shirking. Managers have a powerful in-
centive, for example, to retain independent certified public ac-
countants (CPA's) to audit their financial data. The presence of
CPA's signals to potential investors that managers can shirk less.
Therefore, the price of the stock will rise.2 2
In this regard, Professor George Benston in a recent article
demonstrated that most corporations listed on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) voluntarily retained independent CPA's
before the passage of the Federal Securities Acts, which mandated
use of CPA's.23 The danger of government regulation is that it will




In recent years there has been an effort in the economic litera-
ture to compare empirically the performance of owner- and man-
ager-dominated firms in order to test the theory that managers
shirk more (i.e., do not strive to maximize shareholder welfare) in
corporations not family-dominated.2 5 The evidence is hardly con-
clusive that managers do, in fact, engage in greater shirking than
in family-dominated firms.
lation (March 9, 1979) (unpublished paper presented at the Liberty Fund, Inc. Seminar on
Law and Economics of Accounting Regulation, Law and Economics Center, University of
Miami School of Law). See also Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implica-
tions of Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION
177 (F. Edwards ed. 1979).
22. See Benston, supra note 21, at 10-11.
23. Benston, supra note 11.
24. Id. at 134.
25. R. LARNER, MANAGEMENT CONTROL AND THE LARGE CORPORATION (1970); Elliott,
Control, Size, Growth, and Financial Performance in the Firm, 7 J. FINANCIAL & QUANTITA-
TivE ANALYSIS 1309 (1972); Kamerschen, The Influence of Ownership and Control on Profit
Rates, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 432 (1968); Monsen, Chiu & Cooley, The Effect of Separation of
Ownership and Control on the Performance of the Large Firm, 82 Q. J. ECON. 435 (1968);
Palmer, The Profit-Performance Effects of the Separation of Ownership from Control in
Large U.S. Industrial Corporations, 4 BELL J. EcON. & MANAGEMENT Sci. 293 (1973); Soren-
sen, The Separation of Ownership and Control and Firm Performance: An Empirical Anal-
ysis, 41 S. EcON. J. 145 (1974).
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A recent debate in the economic literature between Professors
Kania and McKean, on the one hand, and Professor McEachern,
on the other, is instructive.2 6 Kania and McKean asserted that
"with the noted exceptions of the Monsen, Chiu, and Cooley
(MCC) and the Palmer studies . . , statistical findings generally
support the position that both firm types performed equally well,
or equally poorly, in regard to profit realization. ' 27 Kania and Mc-
Kean tested numerous indicators of performance and concluded
that "[n]o clear definite difference emerged between owner and
manager-controlled corporations for the performance tests over-
all.,28
Kania and McKean recognized, however, that the degree of
product competition in a given industry might affect the relation-
ship between firm performance and the separation of ownership
and control. They ran tests on this variable and concluded that
"[lthe hypothesis that latitude for greater discretionary behavior
between owner and manager-controlled firms will result when
markets are more highly concentrated is not validated.
'29
Professor McEachern contested the validity of the Kania and
McKean findings. 0 He emphasized that the separation and control
theories "argue that managers must also be relatively free from the
product-market constraint" in order to enjoy managerial discre-
tion. 1 McEachern then argued that the Kania and McKean sam-
ple was biased in favor of competitive industries. Therefore, their
"tests examining behavior based on control .. .are of limited
value. The authors cannot reject a hypothesis that has not been
properly tested." 2
Kania and McKean defended their findings in a reply to Mc-
Eachern.33 They reassured McEachern, however, that they agreed
that the "controversy concerning managerial discretion based upon
26. This debate is contained in the following series of articles: Kania & McKean, Own-
ership, Control and the Contemporary Corporation: A General Behavior Analysis, 29
KYKLos 272 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kania & McKean I]; McEachern, Ownership, Con-
trol, and the Contemporary Corporation: A Comment, 31 KYKLOS 491 (1978); Kania & Mc-
Kean, Ownership, Control, and the Contemporary Corporation: A Reply, 31 KYKLos 497
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Kania & McKean II].
27. Kania & McKean I, supra note 26, at 273.
28. Id. at 287.
29. Id. at 288.
30. McEachern, supra note 26.
31. Id. at 492.
32. Id. at 493.
33. Kania & McKean II, supra note 26.
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control type . . . 'is still very much alive.' "
In the exchange between the professors, McEachern claimed
that some research had found the rate of return on stock pur-
chased and held for a period of time higher for shares in owner-
controlled firms than for shares in manager-run corporations." If
he is correct, then the Jensen and Meckling argument that the
market impounds such a difference in the price of shares is
threatened.
Those results appear suspect. They must mean that share-
holders have been unaware of the possibility of management dis-
cretion existing in high concentration industries. Given the effi-
cient market, this would be a remarkable phenomenon, if true.
Furthermore, the publication of research indicating a significant
difference in return would immediately have the result of depress-
ing the share price of manager-run firms, thus eliminating the dif-
ference in the future. When that happens, managers will have a
powerful incentive to prove that they are shirking less, so as to
retard the decline in price of their corporation's shares. Otherwise,
the drop will depress their wage package to the extent it is based
on stock options and equity incentives. Furthermore, any price
drop will impact negatively on their reputation as managers.
There is also a debate in the economic literature concerning
the proposition that product monopoly will permit a greater degree
of management discretion than is possible where there is product
competition." Jensen and Meckling argue:
The owners of a firm with monopoly power have the same in-
centive to limit divergences of the manager from value maxi-
mization . . . as do the owners of competitive firms. Further-
more, competition in the market for managers will generally
make it unnecessary for the owners to share rents with the
manager....
Since the owner of a monopoly has the same wealth incen-
tives to minimize managerial costs as would the owner of a com-
petitive firm, both will undertake that level of monitoring which
equates the marginal cost of monitoring to the marginal wealth
increment from reduced consumption of perquisites by the
manager.8 7
34. Id. at 498.
35. McEachern, supra note 26, at 494.
36. Compare 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR: MANAGERIAL
OBJECTIVES IN A THEORY OF THE FIRM 2 (1964) with Jensen & Meckling, supra note 13, at
329.
37. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 13, at 329-30.
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Conversely, the presence of product competition will not nec-
essarily eliminate all management discretion. If competitors are
forced to incur some agency costs, i.e., some degree of management
discretion, then other firms will be able to incur management dis-
cretion and yet stay in business.8s
D. Market for Control
One of the key issues in the economic literature is the extent
to which the market for control disciplines corporate managers.
Professor Manne has written a series of seminal pieces on the
power of tender offers and other take-over attempts to discipline
corporate insiders.8 9 As noted above, all evidence indicates that the
stock markets are very efficient, i.e., they rapidly impound all ma-
terial public data into the price of shares.40 Directors and officers
who take too much out of the corporation in the form of perqui-
sites will tend to drive down the price of the corporation's shares.
Honest but inefficient management will depress earnings and, as a
result, the market price of the corporation's shares will fall. The
company then becomes an attractive target for a tender offer from
outside groups that believe they can run the corporation more effi-
ciently than the incumbent management. The outsiders will com-
pare the expected cost of take-over with the expected gain in the
value of the firm. If the costs are less than the estimated future
increase in the price of the shares that will result from better man-
agement, an outside group will make the take-over effort.
4 1 Of
38. Id.
39. Manne, Our Two Corporate Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259
(1967); Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcON. 110 (1965);
Manne, The "Higher Criticism" of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 399 (1962).
Professor Manne was the pathbreaker in legal scholarship in developing analysis of the rela-
tionship between corporate law and economics. Recent important contributions by scholars
in this field include R. POSNER, supra note 6 and R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPO-
RATION (1978).
40. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
41. See H. MANNE & H. WALLICH, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBIL-
iTy at 16-17 (1972).
S.J. Grossman and O.D. Hart in recent work raise doubt about the value of state and
federal corporate fiduciary principles in the area of tender offers. Grossman & Hart, Disclo-
sure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 J. FIN. 323 (1980); Grossman & Hart, Takeover Bids, the
Free-rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42 (1980). They
raise the so-called free-rider problem in tender offers. The takeover group proposes to make
money from the price appreciation of the purchased shares. Each target shareholder, how-
ever, can make money by not tendering his shares. To overcome this target shareholder
resistance, the takeover group may have to offer too high a price to make the takeover
worthwhile. Of course, since many target shareholders and tender offerors disagree about
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course, the more difficult and expensive it is as a result of govern-
ment regulation to make a tender offer, the greater the cushion
that incumbent management enjoys for its inefficiency.
A recent study of cash tender offers made between January
1956 and June 1974 for firms on the NYSE found that firms which
were the targets of take-over attempts generally had abnormally
low returns prior to the take-over attempts and that successful
take-overs generally led to improved wealth positions for the
shareholders of both the acquired and acquiring firms.",
E. Market for Management
Another potent market check on management discretion is the
market for management.48 The managerial labor market operates
the future of the target corporation under the new management, many takeovers are at-
tempted and are successful.
Grossman and Hart agree that takeover bids are necessary to maintain the efficiency of
incumbent management. How then can the free-rider problem be eliminated? If the law
permitted the takeover group to exclude nontendering target shareholders from the benefits
of all the takeover group's improvements, target shareholders would have no incentive to
refuse to tender their shares. The authors point out that "[o]ne method is. . .to permit a
successful raider to sell the firm's assets or output to another company owned by the raider
at terms which are disadvantageous to minority shareholders." 11 BELL J. ECON. at 43. Such
a squeeze-out merger after a takeover is, of course, prohibited by state corporate fiduciary
law principles. Such a transaction is further chilled by the disclosure requirements of the
Federal Williams Act (§ 14d of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), which would require
disclosure of such a squeeze-out proposal. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976). Society
might benefit, however, from some dilution of such principles because the likelihood of suc-
cessful takeovers impels incumbent management to be more efficient. This critique by econ-
omists of the usefulness of corporate fiduciary principles in certain contexts supports the
criticisms of corporate law fiduciary principles set forth in part III of this article.
42. Kummer & Hoffmeister, Valuation Consequences of Cash Tender Offers, 33 J. FIN.
505, 514 (1978). Dean Richard West of the Amos Tuck School of Business Administration at
Dartmouth College summarized this article as follows:
The authors studied all cash tender offers made between January 1956 and June
1974 for firms on the New York Stock Exchange meeting certain criteria-
eighty-eight firms in all. Using methodology that is now a standard part of the
tool kit of financial economists, they tested the following hypotheses: (1) that
investors in the common stock of target firms generally experienced abnormally
low returns in the period prior to a takeover attempt; (2) that the stockholders
of firms which resisted a tender generally experienced particularly abnormal low
returns prior to a takeover attempt; and (3) that successful tenders lead to an
improved wealth position for the shareholders of both firms involved. Overall,
their results supported all three hypotheses. ...
West, The Federal Securities Code: Some Comments on Process and Outcome, 33 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 1485, 1492 (1979).
43. The material in this and the following section is based upon work by Eugene F.
Fama. See generally Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.
288 (1980).
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to police the activities of corporate employees. Corporations are
constantly on the lookout for new managers. Incumbent managers
realize that if they shirk, they will be replaced by non-shirking
outside managers. Furthermore, there is an inside market which
polices management. Corporate employees realize that their
chances to receive attractive job offers from other corporations de-
pend upon their present success and reputation. If their corpora-
tion does well, their potential wage in the outside market for man-
agers will increase. This consideration provides an incentive to
manage their subordinates tightly. Managers will also monitor
their superiors since the success of their supervisors will reflect on
the reputation of the manager. Moreover, managers have an in-
house incentive to expose shirking bosses and take their place. As a
result, there is a market for management information. In this mar-
ket, data are exchanged concerning the abilities of managers. The
existence of this market makes it difficult for the shirker to hide
his activities.
Acknowledging a market for management weakens the argu-
ment concerning the relationship between management equity
ownership and management incentives. It is commonly argued that
the smaller the percentage of equity owned by management, the
more shirking will occur. The market for management, however,
may operate independently of equity ownership to compel manage-
ment efficiency.
F. Owners or Risk Takers
There is an even more fundamental objection to the separa-
tion of ownership and control hypothesis. It is possible that the
separation of ownership and control issue is the product of an erro-
neous perception of the concept of the corporation. This percep-
tion views shareholders as "owners" who in some way have given
up control over their business to a group of self-seeking shirkers.
Shareholders are not owners; they are risk takers." According to
the teachings of modern portfolio theory the most efficient way to
invest savings is to diversify holdings. As a result, shareholders in-
vest small holdings in many corporations. Other individuals and
groups also make their inputs into each corporation. Labor pro-
vides services. Others sell raw materials to the business. Manage-
ment coordinates the activities and inputs of these groups.
The business firm in this view is a complex of contractual ar-
44. Id.
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rangements among the owners of the various production inputs.
Managers agree to work for a given salary and the risk takers, i.e.,
the shareholders, agree to pay "X" dollars in return for a residual
claim on the firm's earnings. The shareholders resemble lenders,
except that the shareholders are more optimistic, that is, they have
taken a greater risk than debt holders.
G. Conclusions
We can draw a number of significant conclusions from the re-
cent economic literature:
1) The "disadvantages" of separation of ownership and con-
trol are merely one example of the inevitable cost of any form of
joint effort. Universities, government bureaucracies, and co-au-
thors of law review articles all "suffer" agency costs. Government
bureaucracies and nonprofit firms, however, do not enjoy the same
free-market constraints on managerial discretion that corporations
do.
2) The costs of separation of ownership and control include
the cost of monitoring to deter shirking.
3) Monitoring is worthwhile only when the costs of monitor-
ing are less than the benefits derived.
4) Shareholders will voluntarily pay for an amount of moni-
toring that does not exceed the benefits derived. Government-man-
dated monitoring may force the incurring of monitoring costs that
exceed the benefits obtained.
5) The great success of the corporation with dispersed own-
ership is evidence that the benefits of these organizations outweigh
their agency costs.
6) There is debate in the economic literature as to the effect
of separation of ownership and control on the extent of manage-
ment discretion to ignore shareholder interests. The findings are
not conclusive as to the extent of the effect. Many economists be-
lieve that significant discretion exists, if at all, only in the absence
of product competition.
7) If managers can demonstrate to shareholders and poten-
tial investors that they are not shirking, the price of the corporate
shares will rise. Therefore, managers have powerful incentives to
take steps to prove that they are not shirking. (For example, man-
agers have strong motives to hire independent CPA's to demon-
strate a lack of shirking.)
8) The competitive markets for management and control
tend to limit the ability of, or incentive for, managers to shirk.
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9) The traditional concept of the separation of ownership
and control may be based on a totally erroneous view of investors
in publicly held corporations. Shareholders are not "owners" but
risk takers.
The foregoing section constitutes an analysis of the fundamen-
tal problems in corporate law in light of modern economic thought.
The following section considers the main themes of corporate law
in the perspective of this analysis.
III. THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
The most fundamental responsibility of directors is the duty
of loyalty. The Corporate Director's Guidebook45 characterizes
that duty as one in which the director pledges his "allegiance to
the enterprise and acknowledges that the best interests of the cor-
poration and its shareholders must prevail over any individual in-
terest of his own."46 More particularly, the Guidebook prescribes
four specific components of that duty.47 First, whenever a director
has a material personal interest in dealings with the corporation he
should disclose the existence of the interest before the board takes
action and abstain from acting on the matter himself. Second, he
should attempt to resolve conflicting corporate interests fairly,
with concern for the treatment of any minority shareholder who
might be adversely affected. Third, whenever a business opportu-
nity comes to his attention as a result of his relationship to the
corporation, he should present it to the corporation before pursu-
ing the opportunity on his own account. Finally, he should deal in
confidence in corporate matters until there has been public
disclosure.
The Guidebook further declares that the "fundamental re-
sponsibility" of the individual corporate director is to represent
the interests of the shareholders and that the director is not di-
rectly responsible to other constituencies, such as employees, cus-
tomers, or the community, except as specific responsibilities might
be provided by law.' 8 It is recognized that economic objectives will
"play the primary role" in guiding corporate decisions.4"
A similar duty is imposed upon controlling shareholders of a
corporation. They have the same duty as the directors to commit
45. 33 Bus. LAW. 1595 (1978).
46. Id. at 1599.
47. Id. at 1599-1600.
48. Id. at 1606.
49. Id.
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their allegiance to the business and recognize that the best inter-
ests of all of the shareholders (including, of course, the minority
shareholders) must prevail over the particular interests of the con-
trolling shareholders.50 Much corporate law constitutes a develop-
ment of ramifications of the "loyalty" obligations of directors and
control shareholders to the body of all shareholders."' The obliga-
tion is frequently characterized as a fiduciary responsibility, with
directors and controlling shareholders deemed to be fiduciaries in
much the same sense as trustees.52
The purpose of the fiduciary principle is to compel directors
and controlling shareholders to manage the enterprise fairly on be-
half of all the owners rather than in the interest of the managers or
only some of the shareholders. It is essentially a regulatory attempt
to minimize the agency costs of separation of ownership and con-
trol. As such it must satisfy a number of crucial tests:
1) Does it, in fact, lessen the ability of management to depart
from its obligation to maximize shareholder welfare?
2) If it does accomplish this result, does it do so at a cost
which exceeds the benefits of the regulatory structure?
3) Is it needed? That is, are the market constraints on man-
agement more efficient than regulation and the legal process?
A. Management Compensation
Consider the doctrine in the context of management compen-
sation. While the director's duty of loyalty is intended to place
some restraint upon management indulging its self-interest at the
expense of shareholders, the doctrine is notoriously difficult to ap-
ply in the area of compensation, 5 since corporate law cannot simu-
late a "just" compensation package. Only the market can do that.
The question concerning compensation for executives is
whether it is rationally related to various past and future indica-
tors of business performance, such as net profits. The typical legal
case cannot yield empirically valid answers. For example, suppose
a steel executive receives ten percent more than apparently similar
steel company executives in other companies, but that his com-
pany is earning less than many other steel firms. In the absence of
truly egregious facts proving gross corruption and incompetence, it
50. See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
51. See generally W. CARY, supra note 4, at 550-693.
52. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939).
53. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
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is impossible in the typical litigation to determine whether the
market for management is working badly for that particular corpo-
ration, since we do not know a number of relevant facts. Did it
place the executives best suited to holding unavoidable losses to a
minimum? Will it attract the executives best fitted in the long run
to solve the problem? Is the excess compensation necessary to at-
tract managers to a business which for various reasons is perhaps a
less attractive place to work than other companies? Is the corpora-
tion performing poorly because of factors beyond the control even
of able management? Until such questions are answered, the court
is without the means to make a rational judgment. As one judge
put it:
Assuming, arguendo, that the compensation should be re-
vised, what yardstick is to be employed? Who or what is to sup-
ply the measuring rod? The conscience of equity? Equity is but
another name for a human being temporarily judicially robed.
He is not omnipotent or omniscient. Can equity be so arrogant
as to hold that it knows more about managing this corporation
than its stockholders?
Yes, the Court possesses the power to prune these pay-
ments, but openness forces the confession that the pruning
would be synthetic and artificial rather than analytic or scien-
tific. Whether or not it would be fair and just, is highly dubious.
Yet, merely because the problem is perplexing is not reason for
eschewing it. It is not timidity, however, which perturbs me. It is
finding a rational or just gauge for revising these figures were I
inclined to do so. No blueprints are furnished. The elements to
be weighed are incalculable; the imponderables, manifold. To
act out of whimsy or caprice or arbitrariness would be more than
inexact-it would be the precise antithesis of justice; it would be
a farce.5
4
When corporate law imposes judicial decision on executive
wages it is a form of government price fixing. Such an intrusion
into the heart of business distorts demand and supply in the same
unfortunate manner as do all other government efforts at setting
prices.5
In addition, the regulatory apparatus has tremendous costs.
The legal process requires the services of attorneys and account-
ants. The legal expenses are immense. There are also the hidden
54. Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 679 (Sup. Ct.) (Collins, J.), affd without opin-
ion, 263 A.D. 814, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (App. Div. 1941).
55. See, e.g., T. SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 167-229 (1980).
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costs that may occur if management, in fear of lawsuit, keeps com-
pensation at a lower rate than is efficient. That is, if a higher rate
of compensation in the absence of fear of lawsuit would have at-
tracted a proportionately greater management effort, the share-
holders will have lost as a result of the legal doctrine.
There is an additional problem. The duty of loyalty/obligation
of fairness doctrine assumes that the threat of legal process will
have a deterrent effect. The basic hypothesis is that the doctrine
will result in "better" behavior by corporate executives. If it does
not, then the benefit of the corporate law apparatus is nil. It is not
sufficient to prove that corporate law holds down wages. It is nec-
essary to demonstrate that the law chills executive compensation
to an efficient level. Needless to say, this author knows of no con-
clusive evidence that the legal doctrine causes "better," i.e., more
efficient, behavior.
There is convincing evidence in the economic literature that a
firm's profit performance is the key factor in "explaining variations
in the salaries of corporate executives. "" The empirical evidence
supports the thesis that there is an active market for corporate ex-
ecutives.6 7 Able candidates compete for the available positions.
"Excess" wages are eliminated by the active competition for posi-
tions. Poor performers are replaced by more able candidates who
are willing to work at equal or lower salaries.
In a recent paper 8 Professors Crain, Deaton, and Tollison un-
dertook to "determine the extent to which the market for corpo-
rate presidents as a whole provides a mechanism whereby their
conduct is evaluated."65 The researchers stated:
To do this, we introduce length of service as the principal means
by which executive performance is rewarded through the mar-
ket. The basic logic of our approach is that stockholders or
boards of directors who are dissatisfied with the performance of
their appointed company president will seek to replace them
[sic] .... 6o
56. See, e.g., Lewellen & Huntsman, Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance, 60
AM. EcON. REv. 710 (1970); Masson, Executive Motivation, Earnings, and Consequent Eq-
uity Performance, 79 J. POL. ECON. 1278 (1971).
57. Crain, Can Corporate Executives Set Their Own Wages? in THE ATTACK ON CoRPo-
RATE AMERICA 277 (M. Johnson ed. 1978).
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Their empirical results show that
relationships exist between the tenure in office of corporate
presidents and measures of firm performance. We found that at
a highly aggregated level, the tenure of corporate presidents is
positively related in a quite responsive way to profit variations.
This suggests that non-profit maximizing behavior in the private
sector is not typically tolerated in the market for executive
services.61
In conclusion, both empirical evidence and responsible eco-
nomic theory indicate that shirking in the form of "excessive"
compensation is controlled by market forces.
B. Going Private
The "going private" phenomenon is a famous example involv-
ing controversial application of corporate law.6" The so-called
"pure" going private transaction involves a single firm in which the
control group desires to eliminate minority shareholders. The goal
may be accomplished by a tender offer to the minority share-
holders or by a merger or reverse stock split.
The tactic of going private has been opposed by commentators
and many courts on the ground that directors or control sharehold-
ers violate their duty of loyalty/obligation of fairness to minority
shareholders.'8 The argument against going private makes two ba-
sic points: first, that the transaction lacks any economic efficiency
justification and second, that the control group can dictate the
price to the minority shareholders.
First, in the so-called "pure" going private transaction, a sin-
gle corporation expends corporate funds to buy out the minority
group. The transaction never involves the potential synergistic
benefits that result from the combination of two independent busi-
nesses. Opponents therefore argue that the buy-out is without any
economic justification.
In light of the agency cost analysis of corporate structure, this
argument fails. In a going private transaction, the acquiring corpo-
61. Id. at 1374.
62. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. International
Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977). See generally Brudney & Chirelstein, A Re-
statement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978); Note, Going Private, 84 YALE
L.J. 903 (1975).
63. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 570 (5th Cir.), cert, denied,
419 U.S. 844 (1974); Note, Elimination of Minority Share Interest by Merger: A Dissent, 54
Nw. U. L. REV. 629, 635 (1959).
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ration lessens or eliminates the split between ownership and con-
trol. As a consequence, agency costs decrease, and monitoring and
its cost in all forms are decreased or elminated. This is a powerful
economic justification for going private. As Jensen and Meckling
state in their article, "In general if the agency costs engendered by
the existence of outside owners are positive it will pay the ...
shareholders ... to sell out to an owner-manager who can avoid
the costs."' 64 In other words, the newly "gone private" corporation
will be more valuable than the publicly held corporation because of
the elimination of the costs of the split between ownership and
control. When owner-managers estimate that the resources of the
gone private firm will be sufficient to continue successfully the bus-
iness, they will frequently buy out the minority at a price in excess
of the prevailing market price of the shares of the publicly held
firm. When corporate law prevents that transaction or increases its
cost by the imposition of complex legal procedures, the minority
shareholders, as well as the public, are hurt. Ironically, many com-
mentators who call for regulatory constraints of the supposed evils
of the split between ownership and control, bitterly criticize going
private.
Second, the arms-length bargaining contention asserts that the
control group, in the absence of a judicial fairness doctrine, can
unduly influence the price of the cash-out. Opponents assert that
this will occur both in the "pure" going private transaction and in
cash-outs of minority shareholders in mergers of two separate cor-
porations. Therefore, minority shareholders need a judicial fairness
doctrine.
As emphasized throughout this article, however, the cost of
the judicial process must be weighed against its benefits. Further-
more, the corporate law approach must be measured against the
benefits of an alternative free market approach. A corporation that
gains the reputation of freezing out minority shareholders at an
inadequate price will suffer difficulty in raising equity capital in
the future. Potential investors will not buy equity shares, or the
corporation will be forced to sell the shares at a lower price. That
price will reflect investors' estimates of their potential loss if the
corporation goes private. The probability of that adverse impact
will act as a powerful deterrent against overreaching by corporate
insiders.
In rebuttal, opponents will argue that a corporation may go
64. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 13, at 333.
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public and some years later freeze out the minority at a low price
based upon a one-shot short-run psychology that says, "Now that I
have gotten public money at ten dollars and the market has since
sharply dropped, I will buy back at three dollars, keep the profit
and not worry about my loss of reputation." This will seldom if
ever be a rational form of thinking. The corporation can never be
certain that it will not need additional equity financing in the fu-
ture. If it goes private at too low a price, however, it will never be
able to obtain adequate financing in the future. Moreover, corpora-
tions will compete for better reputations. Corporation X will con-
tract with potential investors to buy them out, if at all, in the fu-
ture on more generous terms than corporation Y offers.
On the other hand, because complex and costly legal restraints
increase the costs of going private, corporate law is likely to pro-
duce adverse consequences. Existing minority shareholders will
lose the chance to be bought out at a price in excess of current
market values. Corporations will be less likely to sell stock to fu-
ture minority shareholders because of the difficulty of going pri-
vate in the future. One final consequence is the most certain: as a
result of corporations' needs for legal assistance through the bram-
ble bush of state and SEC rules in this area, the corporate lawyers
will get wealthier. They will be the chief beneficiaries of corporate
law.
C. Corporate Opportunity
Yet another example of the doctrine of the duty of loyalty is
the corporate opportunity rule. Corporate law essentially states
that an economic opportunity which comes to the attention of a
person because of his corporate position cannot be personally ex-
propriated by that person when the opportunity falls within the
type of activity that is pursued by the corporation.6 5 The doctrine
may be formulated broadly or narrowly, depending upon the court
and the jurisdiction. For example, assume a corporation is inter-
ested in possible business acquisitions of type A. If the president
learns of a type A deal he cannot pursue it himself. He must first
offer to his corporation the opportunity to acquire the type A
business.
The doctrine is largely a product of case law. Assume the case
law doctrine did not exist and that the Congress or a state legisla-
65. See, e.g., Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294
U.S. 708 (1935); Lincoln Stores v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (1941).
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ture was considering the advisability of establishing the doctrine
by statute. The first question should address the extent to which
the market accomplishes the desired results. If management fol-
lowed the practice of appropriating opportunities, shareholders
and investors would view this as a form of shirking. The price of
the shares would drop. Furthermore, the market for management
would reflect the shirking in the form of a lowered value on the
future wages of the managers. Management, therefore, would have
a strong incentive to advertise, enforce, and follow a policy of con-
veying all opportunities to the corporation.
Only if managers could successfully hide the fact that they
seize corporate opportunities for themselves might they possibly
follow a different route. Since opportunities come from and are
known to parties outside the corporation, there is little reason to
believe that even in the short run managers could frequently keep
their action secret. Furthermore, other managers have incentives to
monitor their superiors since the good reputation of their super-
visors will enhance their own reputation."'
Even if that is not always true, the question to ask is whether
a law would significantly improve directorial behavior at a cost
which is exceeded by the benefits to be derived. If the acts are
indeed easily hidden, then the legal process could not smoke them
out except by use of a considerable force in the form of expensive
attorneys and accountants. The cost of litigation, some of it
groundless or erroneous, would significantly increase the cost of
doing business. This would result in higher prices and lower busi-
ness productivity.
The doctrine may have other adverse side effects. Directors
may force the corporation to take worthless opportunities, for fear
of lawsuits and bad publicity. Judges may be called upon to evalu-
ate whether the opportunity was suitable or worthwhile for the
corporation, involving an impossible effort at second-guessing free
market decisions. Alternatively, if the courts ignore the suitability
or worth of the opportunity, they could establish a harsh doctrine
which would most certainly accentuate the incentive for directors
to load bad business deals on corporations.
Drafters of a new law as well as proponents of a new judicial
doctrine should have some burden of proving that it will accom-
plish the desired results. Because there is an obvious possibility
that the cost of the legal process necessary to implement the op-
66. See text following note 43 supra.
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portunity doctrine will be greater than the benefits derived, failure
to measure those costs would appear to be irresponsible. The cor-
porate opportunity doctrine has developed by the accretion of case
law. It is fair to say that not one of the questions raised in this
section has been adequately answered by the courts. This pattern
permeates corporate law: case-made or statutory regulation is im-
posed upon the corporate system without sufficient regard to em-
pirical data and relative cost or benefit.
D. Parents and Subsidiaries
The class of cases involving dealings between parent corpora-
tions and subsidiaries provides an additional example of the fair-
ness doctrine. The issue frequently turns on whether the parent
corporation's actions are "fair" to the minority shareholders of the
subsidiary. 7 For example, the dispute may relate to whether the
parent should develop deals which include the Venezuelan subsidi-
ary or be free to organize developments in other geographical areas
which exclude the Venezuelan subsidiary.68 In another transaction,
a parent may be accused of drawing out an excessive amount of
dividends from the subsidiary. This allegedly drains the subsidiary
of cash and chills its ability to grow and expand. Minority share-
holders, of course, receive their pro rata share of dividends based
on the number of shares in the subsidiary which they hold. The
application of the fairness doctrine is inevitably amorphous and
subjective. The payment of large dividends by the subsidiary obvi-
ously drains it of cash necessary for business expansion, which may
hurt the minority shareholders at least in the short run. It may
benefit them in the longer run as the enterprise in its totality pros-
pers due to the parent's wise use of resources. The payout of divi-
dends to the parent, however, benefits the larger enterprise, i.e.,
the operation of the parent and its other subsidiaries. The latter
action benefits the mass of shareholders of the parent. "Fairness"
to the minority shareholders of the subsidiary means less divi-
dends to the parent. "Fairness" to the parent and its shareholders
means more dividends to the parent. It is impossible to establish
an objective judicial test of fairness; the search for judicial fairness
pursues a will-of-the-wisp goal. If the market constraints (e.g.,
product competition, market for control, and market for manage-
67. See, e.g., Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 15 N.Y.2d 150, 204 N.E.2d 643, 256
N.Y.S.2d 607 (1965).
68. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
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ment) are operating, the opportunities for management shirking
will be limited. Moreover, the price of the shares held by the mi-
nority will reflect the impact of decisions that may benefit majority
shareholders of the parent more than minority shareholders of the
subsidiary. Therefore, shareholders' returns on equity may be just
as great as returns on the higher priced shares of the parent.
E. Sales of Control
When a control shareholder sells his control interest in a cor-
poration, the sale is usually at a premium over market price. For
example, if the price of a share of common stock of the XYZ Cor-
poration on the NYSE is thirty dollars a share, the control share-
holder (owning, say, thirty-five percent of the issued and outstand-
ing stock), may sell his block at thirty-seven dollars a share to the
buyer. Minority shareholders frequently take the position in litiga-
tion that the premium represents a corporate asset, i.e., the right
to control the corporation, which must be shared with all the mi-
nority shareholders. They rely heavily on the often debated thesis
of Professor A.A. Berle that "the power of control is an asset which
belongs only to the corporation; . . . payment for that power, if it
goes anywhere, must go in the corporate treasury." 9
Probably the most famous case is Perlman v. Feldmann,/ in
which the Feldmann family sold control of the Newport Corpora-
tion at a premium to a group of end steel users. The time was the
Korean War, when steel was in short supply. Newport was a new-
comer in the steel industry, its physical plant consisting of old in-
stallations in the process of being supplemented by newer facili-
ties. Except in times of scarcity Newport was unable to compete
profitably for customers outside its immediate location. The Feld-
mann family, as the district judge found, had no reason to believe
that Wilport, the purchaser, intended to injure or loot Newport. As
a result of the purchase, the take-over group acquired the power to
buy an assured supply of steel from the steel corporation. The
court held that the minority stockholders of Newport could compel
an accounting for their share of the premium.
71
One interpretation of the case is a variant of the corporate op-
portunity theory. Newport had adopted the "Feldmann Plan" pur-
69. Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1958). For a sampling
of the debate surrounding the sale of control issue, see Andrews, The Shareholders' Right to
Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REv. 505 (1965).
70. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
71. Id. at 178.
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suant to which Newport received interest-free cash advances from
steel users who in return were assured a source of supply. Further,
there was some possibility that Newport could utilize the period of
short supply to obtain the good will of customers with whom it was
dealing, which patronage might extend into a period when the
scarcity ended. These were opportunities, the court asserted, which
the sale of control eliminated. The effective rebuttal to that argu-
ment is that the marriage of Newport with its corporate purchaser
was advantageous, because Newport would be assured of a cus-
tomer in the form of its new parent.
A more fundamental point is the inability of judges and the
judicial process to evaluate the relative business advantages or dis-
advantages of a sale of control. That evaluation is a business de-
cision which should be left to the business process. It might be
argued that the original control group of Newport was selfishly in-
terested in the transaction and therefore the court should apply
some form of intrinsic fairness test or invoke some per se rule
against the sale of control. The crucial point about sale of control,
however, is that the selfishness of the seller cannot result in a
transaction unless the new control group purchases. The new con-
trol group will not purchase unless it believes in its ability to man-
age the corporation profitably in the future. In an efficient securi-
ties market, the price of the corporation stock reflects all of the
material public information pertaining to the corporation, includ-
ing management performance. 7' The hefty premium over that price
paid for the stock of the old control group is evidence that the new
control group believes that it can improve upon the performance of
the old, thereby increasing the price of the stock in the market-
place and recouping the premium.
Another interpretation of Perlman is that it indeed held that
the "pure" sale of control is a corporate asset which must be
shared with minority stockholders. Although the weight of author-
ity in other courts and other jurisdictions would appear to be con-
trary to such a theory,7 ' the sale of control is always circumscribed
by legal uncertainties and caveats, and the constant threat of
costly litigation. Although courts may intone the rule that sales of
control are not per se illegal, the penumbra of the per se theory
impels the courts to a very close scrutiny of such transactions.
Sales of control are a method by which more efficient manage-
72. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
73. See, e.g., Thompson v. Hambrick, 508 S.W.2d 949, 954 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
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ment groups may displace less efficient groups. It is frequently a
method by which management shirking will decrease, because the
new control group will seek to recoup the premium paid for their
stock by shirking less than old management. As a result, society
will benefit. Furthermore, improved performance will result in an
increase in the price of the stock acquired by the new control
group. That increase will be reflected in the increased price of the
minority shares as well. Sales of control, therefore, will tend to
have the same beneficial effects as successful take-over attempts.
When corporate law chills the process, minority shareholders are
harmed.
F. Egregious Situations
It is not even self-evident that corporate law can deal with the
most egregious situations. When control shareholders or directors
take advantage of their position to reap shortrun gain at the ex-
pense of the shareholders in a gross manner, it has been argued
that the legal process can deter, detect, and punish the effort."5 For
example, if a control shareholder-director sells a piece of land obvi-
ously worth fifty thousand dollars at a price of ten million dollars
to the corporation, it is assumed that the self-dealing can be effec-
tively reached by the legal process. There is no evidence, however,
that the cost of corporate law is less than the benefits derived from
occasionally detecting and dealing with the egregious cases. In any
event, more subtle agency costs will not be effectively reached by
the legal process under the duty of loyalty doctrine. It might be
better to let the free market discipline even the most egregious
cases. Corporate managements which develop a reputation for
gross misconduct would find it increasingly difficult to attract in-
vestors and raise new capital. Furthermore, shareholders and man-
agement would, of course, if they desire, be free to enter into con-
tractual arrangements requiring insiders to avoid certain egregious
acts at the risk of contractual suits for damage.
G. Conclusion
In all areas of corporate law, the fiduciary duty doctrine is per-
meated by uncertainty and arbitrariness because of its fundamen-
tally impossible goal: to simulate the arrangements that would en-
74. See notes 39 to 41 and accompanying text supra.
75. See notes 6, 11, 65 and accompanying text supra.
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sue if shareholders actively managed the business. It is difficult to
believe that judges and the cumbersome legal process can act as
proxies for shareholder self-interest in efficient management.
Judges are not entrepreneurs, nor are they shareholders. They do
not ordinarily share the incentives for profit maximization that
such groups share. It is unlikely that their interpretations of the
duty of loyalty will be consistent with what shareholder-owners
would desire. Indeed, the fiduciary doctrine may perversely in-
crease the gap between ownership and control because of the in-
ability of the judicial process to effectively simulate the desire of
shareholders for maximized profits.
Essentially, corporate law is a tool used by the legal profession
to displace the free market process. It is a method by which law-
yers and judges can regulate prices and other factors of production
under the rubric of "fairness." Businessmen have difficulty recog-
nizing this function of corporate law because the doctrine is
clouded in arcane legal jargon.
In addition, corporate law is defective because it has evolved
haphazardly without serious attention to cost-benefit analysis and
empirical data. The need for empirical findings seems obvious, but
has only recently become apparent to the members of the legal
profession. A group of United States senators, including Senator
Ribicoff, recently introduced a bill to reform the federal regulatory
process. Senator Ribicoff stated:
Government regulation has grown dramatically-and it has
sometimes grown haphazardly .... Today people are question-
ing what Government can and should do ....
One important provision in this bill is the requirement that
all Federal agencies conduct a regulatory analysis before issuing
regulations.
[Tihe analysis shall contain a preliminary description of
projected economic ... effects.
It is logical and reasonable to estimate costs . . . before
making any significant decisions.7
This requirement should extend to all of corporate law.
76. 125 CONG. REC. S858, 859 (1979) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff).
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IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. Independent Directors
The separation of ownership and control issue has spawned
strenuous efforts to reform corporate governance. Senator Howard
M. Metzenbaum, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Citizen and
Shareholder Rights and Interests, supports legislation to ensure
greater corporate accountability to guard shareholders' rights and
to establish public faith in corporate governance." The Securities
and *Exchange Commission (SEC) has dealt with the area both in
recent amendments to its proxy rules and in settlements of Com-
mission enforcement actions. 8 In this regard the reform most often
recommended is the requirement that a majority of the board of
directors be composed of independent directors.79 A corollary prin-
ciple is that certain key board committees-audit, nominating, and
compensation-should be comprised of a majority or, better yet,
exclusively of the independent directors. In particular, the received
wisdom is that the audit committee should be staffed exclusively
by independent directors.
The Business Roundtable is a group of 180 persons, each of
whom is the chief executive officer of a major corporation. Re-
cently, they issued a report called The Role and Composition of
Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation."0 They stated
in relevant part as follows:
On the one hand we reject extreme notions which would
disqualify as directors all members of operating management or
all members except the CEO [Chief Executive Officer] ....
The corresponding notion on the other side is represented
by a recent suggestion that all directors should devote full time
to directorship affairs and that there should be no "outsiders."
.. . It seems to us that outside directors (directors who devote
only a part of their time to board responsibilities) can perform a
very valuable service to the corporation. They are windows on
the world who provide a protection against insularity and lack of
vision....
[W]e begin with two minimum propositions: 1. The number
77. Russo & Wolfson, supra note 5.
78. Id.
79. The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned
Corporation, Statement of the Business Roundtable, 33 Bus. LAw. 2083 (1978).
80. Id.
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of outsiders should be at least sufficient to have a substantial
impact on the board decision process ....
2.. . . We believe both the Audit and Compensation Commit-
tees should be composed entirely of non-management directors
and that the Nominating Committee should have a majority of
non-management directors .... It is our belief that in most in-
stances. . . it is desirable that the board be composed of a ma-
jority of non-management directors . . .81
A recent Conference Board study reveals that eighty-three
percent of manufacturing companies now show a majority of
outside directors.82 "The same study shows that if former or re-
tired employees on the board are not considered outsiders, the
numbers are 60 percent for manufacturing companies and 80 per-
cent for non-manufacturing companies."8 Furthermore, the NYSE
now requires all domestically listed corporations to establish and
maintain audit committees composed exclusively of independent
directors.
At the outset it must be emphasized that the industry trend
toward independent directors under the pressure of the NYSE,
Congress, and the SEC continues despite the lack of proof that
independent directors produce better results than management di-
rectors. In fact, Professor Stanley C. Vance in a study concluded
that "In major manufacturing enterprises, there is no quantita-
tive evidence supporting the claim that outside boards of direc-
tors are superior in performance to inside boards of directors."8
Moreover, as this author stated recently:
The most frequently given reason for change is the extent of
corporate scandal, yet there is no proof ... that corporate mis-
conduct is greater today than it has been at other times in his-
tory. The only arguments the S.E.C. and others have offered are
anecdotal accounts of occasional corporate misbehavior, hardly a
convincing reason for fundamental modifications of corporate
governance.
What has happened is that the proponents for change have
subtly shifted the burden of proof. Corporate leaders must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that change should not be
81. Id. at 2107-08.
82. Id. at 2109.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2109-10.
85. S. VANCE, BOARDS OF DIRECTORS, STRUCTURES AND PERFORMANCE 45 (1964) (empha-
sis in original). See also studies cited in W. CAREY, supra note 4, at 207-14.
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made. This is a burden that is difficult to meet and one that has
been shifted so easily because of the anti-business bias prevalent
in our society. It has also shifted because Government officials
and corporate attorneys (many of whom are alumni of Govern-
ment regulatory agencies) have grown up in an atmosphere of
pervasive Government regulation.6
In addition to the lack of empirical proof, there is grave doubt,
on a theoretical basis, as to the efficacy of independent directors.
Outside directors do not have the same incentives as do employee
directors to maximize shareholders' gain. Compare the case of an
inside director with a large equity investment in the corporation,
or a compensation package closely related to profit performance, to
an outside director who has no investment in the corporation and
no personal stake in success except insofar as he is an outside di-
rector. How will the two compare on willingness to take entre-
preneurial risks, sensitivity to pressure from legislators, attitude
toward dividend pay-out rates, willingness to dilute profit max-
imization with their own social or political goals, and desire to pay
large rewards to attract and hold brilliant performers?
Outside directors by definition have no financial interest in
the corporation. They are disinterested. That is the problem, not
the solution. They are not only likely to be less interested in maxi-
mizing profits, but will probably be more inclined to represent
nonshareholder interests, such as the desires of SEC regulators,
than are inside directors. They will also be more inclined to be
conservative in business decisions, more sensitive to all outside
pressures, and be preoccupied with their role as second-guessers of
management rather than entrepreneurs.
If corporations wanted to take the risks implicit in the con-
servative role of outside directors, then the pressures of the market
for control and management would act as an effective restraint on
errors by outside directors. Also, shareholders would be free to se-
lect investments in the same or different industries, based in part
on the market's assessment of the success of outside-director domi-
nated corporations. A mandatory government regulatory program,
on the other hand, will have the effect of loading the monitoring
costs of outside directors on corporations without room for alterna-
tive shareholder choice.
Increased regulatory costs often lead to either smaller prof-
its or higher prices, both of which create jobs for lawyers and
86. Russo & Wolfson, supra note 5 (emphasis in original).
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Government regulators and not for the shareholders or the gen-
eral public. Indeed, this operates as a kind of retrogressive tax
on consumers with low incomes who find it increasingly difficult
to pay the higher prices.
8 7
Professor George Benston pointed out in a recent article 8 that
managers of publicly owned corporations have incentives to in-
crease visible monitoring costs voluntarily. As they increase such
costs, for example in the form of audits by independent account-
ants, the public will have more confidence in the business and will
be willing to pay a higher price for its equity shares. In a recent
study, Benston demonstrated that publicly owned corporations re-
tained independent auditors and prepared adequate financial
statements even before the federal securities legislation was placed
on the books.89 In short, there is a powerful self-interest motiva-
tion for managers of publicly owned corporations to incur noticea-
ble monitoring costs in order to maintain and increase the price of
issuers' shares.
Therefore, managers of some publicly held corporations may
have an interest in voluntarily appointing and electing some inde-
pendent directors to the board in order to maintain the confidence
of public investors. If the structure is governmentally mandated,
however, the likelihood is that the mandated structure will impose
greater costs as compared to the structures that would be devised
voluntarily in a free market.
There is in the nature of a governmentally mandated system
no limit on cost. Independent auditors monitored the discretion of
insider management before SEC regulation was put in place. SEC
regulations now require independently audited statements which
contain more detail than the older voluntarily prepared docu-
ments.' Yet, in the opinion of the SEC, the NYSE, and Nader
groups, these regulations have proven insufficient.' 1 Repeating the
classic problem of who will guard the Platonic guardians, the SEC
is moving toward requiring that boards and board audit commit-
tees be composed exclusively of outside directors who will monitor
the monitoring ability of the independent accountants.'2 The
87. Id.
88. See Benston, supra note 21.
89. See Benston, supra note 11.
90. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aa (25), (26), (27) (Schedule A) (1975).
91. See R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 157-69.
92. See Address by H. Williams, Chairman of the SEC, Corporate Accountability One
Year Later, Sixth Annual Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 18, 1979).
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reader can be sure that government will not rest with this. The
next wave of reform will probably mandate government directors
to monitor the monitoring of the independent directors who moni-
tor the CPA monitors.
B. Shareholder Democracy
Another proposal calls for a drastic modification in the compo-
sition of boards of directors to include so-called constituency direc-
tors who will represent local communities, women, suppliers, cus-
tomers, and so on. Professor Ralph K. Winter has argued that this
proposal will, contrary to the expressed desires of the reformers,
act to widen the gulf between control and ownership. 98 He believes
that the directors will represent interests different from, and often
opposed to, the interests of the shareholders, establishing a wide
gulf between the desire of shareholders for maximum profits and
the interests of the outside constituencies.
There is a related campaign to increase the direct control of
shareholders over directors and senior management. This category
of change includes recommendations for direct shareholder nomi-
nation of directors, corporate financing for the election campaigns
of such directors, and independent-director control over the nomi-
nating committees of the board."
As in the case of independent directors, discussed above in
Part A, there would be no fundamental objection if this approach
were truly voluntary. Under state law shareholders are free to es-
tablish corporate structures which will grant greater power and au-
thority to shareholders. If such freely contracted-for management
arrangements resulted in greater profits for shareholders, the sys-
tem would undoubtedly spread. A governmentally mandated sys-
tem, however, will increase the monitoring costs of the owners
without a proportionately greater increase in corporate profits and
shareholder wealth.
There is no empirical evidence that granting more rights to
widely dispersed shareholders increases shareholder wealth. In-
deed, the evidence is to the contrary. As Professor Allen Hyman
has pointed out, stock prices of corporations that announced their
intent to reincorporate in Delaware outperformed the Standard &
93. R. WINTER, supra note 39, at 50. See generally Chayes, The Modern Corporation
and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 25, 38-39 (E. Mason ed.
1959).
94. See R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 3. See also P. BLUMBERG, THE
MEGACORPORATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: THE SCOPE OF CORPORATE POWER (1975).
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Poor's average at the time of the public statement.95 Delaware is
notoriously generous in granting powers to management rather
than to shareholders."6 If earnings suffered from such a structure,
corporations would choose other states. The move to Delaware is
empirical evidence of the irrelevance of the arguments for more
shareholder power.
Shareholder-owners hire managers to run the enterprise for
the benefit of the owners. Agents perhaps fall short in maximizing
shareholder wealth. The managers, however, act within the con-
straints of the market for control and management. Many econo-
mists also believe that product competition acts as a powerful con-
straint on management discretion. Further, the managers
themselves have an incentive to hire monitors voluntarily. This in-
creases both the shareholders' confidence and the price at which
the corporation can sell shares to the public.
Governmentally mandated steps to increase shareholder power
should pass the cost-benefit test before they are adopted. If gov-
ernment politicizes the corporate structure by, for example, forcing
corporations to fund shareholder proxy fights for election of direc-
tors, the corporation pays a price. The price includes the direct
costs of the proxy battles as well as the indirect costs of pseudo-
political party strife. In effect, these are increased monitoring
costs. They must be balanced against the benefits, if any, to be
derived.
The ostensible purpose for increasing shareholder power is to
strengthen the shareholders' ability to monitor directly the wealth-
maximizing efforts of the managers. Shareholders, however, have
little interest in, or time for, such monitoring. Modern portfolio
theory recommends that shareholders diversify their holdings as
much as possible. 7 Intelligent investors become relatively small
stakeholders in numerous enterprises. An investor who has
purchased five hundred dollars worth of common stock in each of
many corporations has only a limited ability to concentrate on
each of his investments. His time is better spent in deciding when
to hold, sell, or buy rather than in participating in corporate politi-
95. Hyman, Do Lenient State Incorporation Laws Injure Minority Shareholders? in
THE ATrACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA 166 (M. Johnson ed. 1978). See also R. WINTER, supra
note 39.
96. See generally Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
97. See Wolfson, New Theories of Portfolio Management Challenge SEC Doctrine, 1
CORP. L. REV. 67 (1978).
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cal contests. Indeed, it would be against his self-interest to devote
considerable time to selecting nominees for each board and joining
in numerous campaigns for their elections. He has a much better
route to investment success. If the price of the stock in a particular
corporation falls, he can effortlessly sell his stock and invest else-
where. Similarly, if the price rises he can sell and make a profit.
When enough shareholders sell, a powerful message is trans-
mitted to the anxious managers who closely watch the price move-
ment of the shares. Price drops may be the signal to outsiders to
wage a take-over bid to capture control of the corporation in the
belief that they can run the corporation better than incumbent
management.
In light of the evidence developed in this paper for the efficacy
of the current corporate structure, the arguments for shareholder
reform appear unconvincing. Many of the proponents are groups
and individuals with little or no interest in investors and the value
of the private corporation. Rather, they are interested in wresting
control from the private sector and transferring it to the
government.
Cooperative behavior necessarily results in agency costs. The
costs are an inevitable concomitant of the act of joint endeavor. It
is clear that increased monitoring of these costs does not automati-
cally result in greater shareholder wealth. Otherwise, the problem
would never exist-it would be a non-issue. Owners enter into the
agency relationship because it is more efficient than trying to run
the business without managers. When they do so, they cannot
spend their entire lives monitoring the agents. They cannot stand
at the agent's side throughout the day. This would be patently ab-
surd. Excessive monitoring would be identical to elimination of the
agency relationship.
Absurd as this example is, it is relevant to the shareholder de-
mocracy argument. The purpose of the structure separating control
and ownership is to capture the efficiencies and benefits that flow
from the arrangement. Shareholders invest in the expectation that
the trade-off between agency shirking and agency effort will be
worth the investment. When the trade-off ceases to be attractive,
the shareholder sells and either enters into another investment or
spends the money on goods. The objective of "shareholder democ-
racy" proponents is to force shareholders into greater monitoring
efforts, regardless of the cost. If the reformers succeed in their leg-
islative efforts, shareholders will intelligently respond in the form
of massive indifference to the new system. They will not vote.
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They will not even read the election literature. They will become
"alienated" voters. This will be a signal, not of their "sinfulness,"
but of their wise choice as to where they should direct their ener-
gies. In that regard they will, of course, continue to wield their po-
tent and effective weapon-the power to sell.
The irrelevance of the shareholder democracy argument is a
symptom of a deeper malaise in the current theory about corporate
law. The section on fundamental assumptions refers to the concept
of shareholders as risk takers rather than owners. Except for being
more optimistic, they are like bank lenders. The concept of owner-
ship is irrelevant to shareholders. Indeed, pursuit of shareholder
democracy will only load additional unwanted costs on this partic-
ular class of risk takers, thereby increasing their risks, not their
gain.
V. CONCLUSION
Corporate law is to a considerable extent a reaction to the sep-
aration of ownership and control issue, as well as an effort to re-
solve it. As such, corporate law offers essentially a questionable so-
lution to an exaggerated problem. Modern economic theory
demonstrates that all joint endeavor involves "agency costs." The
modern publicly held corporation is no exception. The corporation
of widely dispersed shareholders, however, draws its strength, not
weakness, from the separation of ownership and control.
Thousands of investors in their role as risk takers voluntarily place
their capital into the hands of skilled managers. The markets for
management and control constrain management discretion within
reasonable limits. The self-interest of managers stimulates them to
incur significant monitoring costs as a signal to the public that the
managers are performing efficiently. Much of corporate law oper-
ates without heed to cost and market constraints in a case-by-case
effort to control managers. It is likely that much of corporate law
produces more harm than good and frequently interferes with the
benefits that would flow from the competitive forces of the
marketplace.
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